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Legal Developments 
Special Issue on Advertising Law and Regulation 
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Guest Editor 
University of Texas, Austin 
Advertising Research Issues From FTC 
Versus Stouffer Foods Corporation 
J. Craig Andrews and Thomas J. Maronick1 
Extrinsic evidence is frequently offered in Federal Trade 
Commission advertising deception cases, most often in the 
form of advertising research, such as copy tests. Although 
generally accepted principles exist for copy test evidence 
presented before the Commission, how these principles are 
operationalized can provide fertile ground for challenges. 
Thus, the authors review six copy testing and ad interpreta-
tion issues from the recent Stouffer Foods case. The authors 
discuss difficult tradeoffs inherent in relative versus absolute 
claims, multiple claims, control ad groups, control ques-
tions, and disclosure information. The careful consideration 
of such trade-offs in advertising research decisions will help 
in the preparation of extrinsic evidence before the 
Commission. 
The role of extrinsic evidence in Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) advertising deception cases is becoming increas-
ingly important. Although not required per se, such evi-
dence is nonetheless considered and often given substantial 
weight in cases regarding implied claims (Thompson Medi-
cal Co. 1984, CD at 789),2 particularly when a "facial anal-
ysis" by the Commission is insufficient. Extrinsic evidence 
is frequently presented in the form of expert testimony, com-
mon usage of terms, generally accepted principles in mar-
keting research, and methodologically sound consumer re-
search studies (Kraft, Inc. 1991, CD at 121-22). In recent 
years, advertising copy tests tend to represent the primary 
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form of extrinsic evidence offered. As the Commission notes 
in Thompson Medical (1984, CD at 789), 
The extrinsic evidence we prefer to use and to which we give 
great weight is direct evidence of what consumers actually 
thought upon reading the advertisement in question. Such evi-
dence will be in the form of consumer survey research for wide-
ly distributed ads .... 
However, though generally accepted principles and case 
precedent exist for the use of copy tests in FTC advertising 
cases, how such principles and precedent are operational-
ized is likely to vary depending on the context of the case 
(cf. Maronick 1991). Thus, decisions on copy test method-
ology represent fertile ground for challenges in FTC adver-
tising deception cases (Jacoby and Szybillo 1995; Maronick 
1991; Preston 1987, 1992; Stewart 1995; Sudman 1995). In 
fact, in the Stouffer Foods Corporation case, 40% of the re-
cent Commission opinion (Stouffer Foods Corp. 1994, CD 
at 9-17) and almost 66% of the Administrative Law Judge's 
(AU) initial decision (Stouffer Foods 1993, ID at 29-36, 38) 
involved consideration of the probative value of methodolo-
gies employed in the complaint counsel (i.e., FTC) and re-
spondent (i.e., Stouffer Foods) copy tests. 
Thus, given the potential for challenges, the purpose of 
our review is to discuss six important copy test and ad inter-
pretation issues raised in the recent Stouffer Foods case. 
These six issues are (1) conveyance of relative and absolute 
claims, (2) multiple ad claim interpretation, (3) the use of 
control ad groups and open-ended questions, (4) pre-exist-
ing beliefs and the role of control ad groups, (5) the role of 
control questions and their interpretation, and (6) the pro-
cessing of disclosure information. The purpose of our dis-
cussion is to help provide guidance for those preparing cases 
with extrinsic evidence for FTC consideration. In examining 
the often difficult trade-offs in the design of such copy tests, 
we incorporate a variety of principles from consumer, ad-
vertising, and marketing research. Before examining these 
points, however, we present a brief review of the Stouffer 
Foods case and the specific complaint. 
Case Background and Complaint 
In 1991, the FTC issued a complaint against Stouffer Foods, 
alleging that Stouffer violated Sections 5 and 12 of the FTC 
Act by disseminating ads that falsely represented the sodium 
content of its Lean Cuisine entrees (Stouffer Foods 1994, 
CD at 1). Specifically, the complaint alleged, first, that 
Stouffer's ads falsely represented Lean Cuisine entrees as 
low in sodium through statements such as: they "skimp on: 
Calories. Fat. Sodium. With less than 300 calories, con-
trolled fat and always less than 1 gram of sodium per entree, 
we make good sense taste great." The complaint also noted 
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that a footnote in fine print from the ads stated: "All Lean 
Cuisine entrees have been formulated to contain less than 1 
gram (1000 milligrams) of sodium." Second, the complaint 
alleged that the ads failed to disclose adequately the materi-
al fact that "1 gram is equivalent to 1000 milligrams, which 
is the commonly used unit of measurement for sodium" 
(Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at introduction). 3 
In reply, Stouffer argued (among other issues) that its 
campaign focused on great taste, controlled fat, calories, and 
sodium. Furthermore, Stouffer contended that the sodium 
content claim was relative in nature, expressing a reduction 
(i.e., lower) in the sodium amount, but not implying low 
sodium, which consumers associated with bland taste 
(Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at 27). 
Based on the trial evidence, the AU concluded that Stouf-
fer did misrepresent their Lean Cuisine entrees as low in 
sodium (Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at 29, 35-36, 39). The 
Commission agreed with the AU on the basis of a facial 
analysis of the ads and the extrinsic evidence offered by the 
complaint counsel (see Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 7, 9, 17). 
The AU also determined the low sodium claim to be pre-
sumptively material, because it significantly involved a 
health claim important to the audience (Stouffer Foods 
1993b, ID at 37). Other evidence for materiality was noted 
in the AU's findings, including the linkage between sodium 
and high blood pressure, Stouffer's copy test results show-
ing that 68% of the participants considered sodium to be im-
portant in making purchase decisions about frozen entrees, 
and company research documents and intent (see Stouffer 
Foods 1993b, IDF 171-81).4 The Commission agreed with 
the AU and noted that Stouffer did not challenge the AU's 
findings regarding the materiality of the low sodium claim 
(Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 7, n. 11). 
Although the AU determined that the low sodium claim 
was material, he also concluded that failing to adequately 
disclose that one gram was equal to 1000 milligrams was 
immaterial (Stouffer Foods 1993, ID at 35-38). His reason-
ing was that, though the sodium content in milligrams was 
presumptively material, the trial evidence showed that most 
consumers were unaware of the recommended daily al-
lowance for sodium, and that knowing the precise mil-
ligrams of sodium in an entree would be of little use to them 
(Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at 38). The Commission agreed 
that the ads did not adequately disclose that one gram equals 
1000 milligrams and noted that the complaint counsel did 
not appeal the dismissal of the milligram disclosure allega-
tion (see Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 2). 
3The Commission finds deception if there is a representation, omission, 
or practice that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the 
circumstances, and this representation, omission, or practice is material 
(Cliffdale Associates, Inc. 1984, CD at 165). 
4Information is material if it is important to consumers and, therefore, 
likely to affect their choice of or conduct regarding a product ( Cliffdale As· 
sociates, Inc. 1984, CD at 165). Discussion regarding presumptively mate-
rial claims can be found in Cli.ffdale Associates (CD at 182-83). See also a 
discussion of extrinsic evidence offered for materiality in Jacoby and Szy-
bilJo (1995), Kraft (1991, CD at 134-38), and Stewart (1995). 
General Standards for FTC Advertising 
Copy Tests 
The standard the Commission uses in evaluating advertising 
claims is the "overall, net impression made by the ad" 
(Kraft, Inc. 1991, CD at 122; Thompson Medicall984, CD 
at 790). The key term in the Commission's consideration of 
extrinsic evidence, such as advertising copy tests, is gener-
ally accepted principles.5 Such general standards or princi-
ples in Commission cases evolve from the discussion of 
legal precedent by marketing and legal scholars (e.g., Jaco-
by and Szybillo 1995; Maronick 1991; Morgan 1990; Owen 
and Plyler 1991; Plevan and Siroky 1991; Preston 1987, 
1989, 1992; Stewart 1995), as well as from the actual FTC 
cases themselves (e.g., American Home Products Corp. 
1981; Bristol-Myers 1975; Kraft, Inc. 1991; Stouffer Foods 
1994; Thompson Medicall984). In general, the Manual for 
Complex Litigation (1982, p. 120; see also Jacoby and Szy-
billo 1995), suggests a list of principles to be considered in 
determining whether a survey offered as evidence was prop-
erly conducted, including that: 
(1) the proper universe was examined, (2) a representative sam-
ple was drawn from that universe, (3) the mode of questioning 
the interviewees was correct, ... ( 4) the persons conducting the 
survey were recognized experts, (5) the data gathered were ac-
curately reported, and (6) the sampling design, the question-
naire, and the interviewing were in accordance with generally-
accepted standards of objective procedure and statistics in the 
field of such surveys. 
As the Manual indicates, once the survey has passed the 
test of admissibility in trial testimony, objections to the 
manner in which it was conducted apply to the relative 
weight of the survey as evidence. 6 We now explore these 
principles (and related ones) in terms of their application to 
evidence offered at the FTC, including that found in Stouf-
fer Foods (1993a, b, c, 1994). 
Universe and Sample 
The Commission has determined that surveys are to be 
based on valid samples drawn from the appropriate popula-
tion, ask appropriate questions that minimize bias, and ana-
lyze results correctly (Thompson Medica/1984, CD at 790). 
Specifically, the Commission has determined that the sam-
ple should be representative of the appropriate universe 
(e.g., potential purchasers of the advertised product, given 
the appropriate target market characteristics; cf. Thompson 
Medical 1984, CD at 795). In Stouffer Foods (l993b, IDF 
5These principles are not necessarily consistent with alJ principles for 
copy tests (or their application) found in the ad industry or in Lanham Act 
cases, whereby one company sues another in federal court for misleading 
advertising claims. In the case of the ad industry, copy test objectives can 
include persuasive aspects of the ad beyond the FfC objectives of measur-
ing the conveyance of a particular ad claim (cf. "Positioning Advertising 
Copy Testing" 1982). In Lanham Act cases, the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff, because they must affirmatively prove the claim in question is 
false and misleading, not merely that it is unsubstantiated (American Home 
Products v. The Procter & Gamble Co., Syntex USA, and Procter-Syntex 
Health Products 1994 at 13, n.14; Preston 1987, pp. 687-89). 
6Interested readers are directed to a discussion of these and related prin-
ciples for designing and conducting survey and copy test evidence for use 
at trial in Jacoby and Szybillo (1995), Maronick (1991), Morgan (1990}, PI-
evan and Siroky (1991), and Stewart (1995). 
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69), the complaint counsel's (i.e., the Commission's) copy 
test sample was drawn from a "universe consisting of 
women who were principal food shoppers for their house-
hold, between the ages of 25 and 54, who had purchased a 
frozen entree in the last three months and who were not fol-
lowing a medically supervised diet." Stouffer argued (Stouf-
fer Foods 1993c, RB at 40-44) that the universe from which 
the complaint counsel's sample was drawn was too narrow 
and excluded portions of the Lean Cuisine purchasing and 
consuming population at whom the challenged ads were di-
rected (e.g., women younger than 25 years of age and older 
than 54 years of age, men of all ages, and those on medical-
ly supervised diets). However, though recognizing this po-
tential defect, the AU concluded that " ... there is no evidence 
to show that the results would have differed if [the excluded 
categories] would have been included, and there is no doubt 
that those surveyed were the bull' s eye of the target at which 
the ads were aimed" (Stouffer Foods l993b, ID at 30). 
Stouffer's copy test relied on a universe of "potential pur-
chasers of Lean Cuisine, regardless of whether they were in 
the target audience for the ads" (Stouffer Foods l993b, IDF 
121). The AU concluded (Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at 35) 
that Stouffer's universe was defective because of (1) the 
skewing of the sample toward men and older participants 
and (2) the exclusion of Stouffer's "Red Box" entree pur-
chasers (Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 122-25). 
It should also be noted that the FTC does not require that 
a probability sample be drawn. In Bristol-Myers (1975, CD 
at 744, n. 14), the FTC reasoned that " ... while the samples 
were not scientifically drawn utilizing probability sampling 
procedures, those interviewed probably reasonably repre-
sented the class of antiperspirant or female antiperspirant 
users." Furthermore, the FTC views the use of mall inter-
cepts for data collection favorably in sampling design 
(Thompson Medical1984, CD at 794-95), in part because 
such studies are the generally accepted methods for adver-
tising copy-test research. 
Design Issues 
One study design issue, receiving perhaps the most recent 
attention by the FfC, is that of the appropriate controls to 
use to enhance the validity of the results (Kraft, Inc. 1989, 
IDF 121). The use of a control ad group (e.g., respondents 
who see a control rather than a test ad) may help to ensure 
that responses to the challenged ad claims are not due to fac-
tors other than the challenged ad claims in question. In ad-
dition, certain copy test questions may prompt biasing, such 
as a yea-saying response. In this case, using one or more 
control questions about a claim not appearing in the chal-
lenged ad, yet one that is plausibly associated with the prod-
uct, is important for measuring the extent of yea-saying bias 
in response to closed-ended questions. Arguments regarding 
the nature and type of controls were prevalent in Stouffer 
Foods (l993b, IDF 11, 13-15, 18-20, ID at 31-35, 1994, 
CD at 10-17) and are subsequently discussed in this article. 
Questionnaire Issues 
In examining challenged ads and claims, the FTC considers 
the " ... overall net impression made by the ad to determine 
what messages it reasonably can be interpreted as conveying 
to consumers" (Thompson Medical 1984, CD at 790; see 
also Cliffdale Associates, Inc. 1984, CD at 175, n. 4). In 
terms of format, survey questions generally follow a funnel 
approach; that is they begin with general open-ended ques-
tions and ask successively narrower questions, ending with 
specific closed-ended questions (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 110). 
For open-ended questions, sufficient probing is necessary to 
elicit consumer understanding of the implied claims. In the 
case of closed-ended questions, potential order biases of not 
only the questions, but also of response options, can be ex-
amined through rotating study questions and providing mul-
tiple response options (cf. Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 
129-33). Additionally, the FTC views the provision of 
"don't know" options and instructions in the questionnaire 
favorably when it examines copy test results (Stouffer Foods 
1993b, IDF 96-97, 1994, CD at 11, 12; see also Plevan and 
Siroky 1991, p. 633). Finally, the questionnaire and proce-
dures should be pretested to detect potential problems (e.g., 
leading questions, questions that are not mutually exclusive) 
before the administration of the final study. 
In the Stouffer case, the AU found the complaint counsel 
(FTC) copy test to be probative because it started with "un-
biased open-ended questions" (Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 
81, ID at 31) and because "the closed-ended questions were 
rotated" (Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 98-99, ID at 33). On 
the other hand, the AU found the Stouffer Foods copy test 
less probative because of its "methodological deficiencies," 
including the fact that the respondents were not funneled 
from open-ended questions to closed-ended questions 
(Stouffer Foods l993b, IDF 120, 126-27). Citing trial testi-
mony, the AU noted: "It is not appropriate to start a copy 
test with (closed-ended) questions" (Stouffer Foods 1993b, 
IDF 128). 
Experience Counts 
Perhaps one of the more important of the generally accept-
ed principles at the Commission is that experience and com-
petence count in all aspects of the copy test (Maronick 
1991). For example, in Bristol-Myers (1975, CD at 744, 
n.14), the importance of experience is cited for the research 
organization; the type of research conducted by the organi-
zation; and those involved in the research design, supervi-
sion, and interviewing activities of the study. Such experi-
ence in the design and execution of the complaint counsel's 
copy test in the Stouffer Foods case was noted by the AU 
(Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 52, 61, 67). 
Data Reporting 
An important issue in previous Commission decisions has 
been the appropriate reporting of the verbatims, that is, the 
outcome of open-ended questions (Preston 1987, pp. 656, 
683). For example, the Commission rejected evidence for 
verbatim responses not placed on the record (Thompson 
Medical 1984, CD at 795) and not properly coded (Standard 
Oil of California 1974, CD at 1401; Thompson Medical 
1984, CD at 795). It is noteworthy that the record in Stouf-
fer Foods (l993a, b, c) does not indicate any problems with 
the coding of the open-ended results. This, no doubt, reflects 
that both parties used experts experienced in conducting 
consumer survey research. 
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Ad Stimuli Concerns 
In addition, difficult aspects of the ad stimuli can present 
challenges to those designing copy tests for litigation and in 
the interpretation of challenged claims. For example, the in-
terpretation of relative (e.g., lower) versus absolute (e.g., 
low) claims, the interaction or relationships among multiple 
claims, and consumer interpretation of disclosure informa-
tion may be at issue, as is argued in Stouffer Foods ( 1993c, 
RB at 19-35; 1994, CD at 7, 8). We now examine our six ad 
interpretation and copy test issues as they. relate to the Com-
mission decision and rationale presented in the Stouffer 
Foods case. 
Relative and Absolute Claims 
In his decision, the ALJ found that the Lean Cuisine ads 
conveyed a "low sodium claim to reasonable consumers" 
(Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at 29). On appeal, Stouffer argued 
the ALJ had ignored elements in the ads that conveyed that 
Lean Cuisine products had a reduced or lower quantity of 
sodium, rather than an absolute low amount (Stouffer Foods 
1994, CD at 7). One challenged radio ad, cited by the ALJ, 
describes Lean Cuisine entrees as follows: "These babies are 
healthier than ever. Lower in sodium, fat and cholesterol. 
Read those boxes, people, these numbers are low" (Stouffer 
Foods 1993b, ID at 29). Stouffer argued (Stouffer Foods 
1993c, RB at 38-39, see also RB at 24) that the relative in-
formation in the ad (e.g., "healthier," "lower") was promi-
nent and would contradict impressions of "absolute low-
ness" taken from other aspects of the ad (e.g., "these num-
bers are low"). As their legal basis for this argument, Stouf-
fer cited Thompson Medical (1984, CD at 793, 803), in 
which the Commission notes that contradictory elements in 
the ads precluded determining with sufficient certainty what 
message viewers gained from the ads. 
The Commission, however, saw no basis for concluding 
that the reduced and low sodium claims are mutually exclu-
sive (Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 8). As reasoned by the ALJ 
and accepted by the Commission (Stouffer Foods 1994, CD 
at 8), the comparative, "lower in sodium," does not conflict 
with the absolute claim, "these numbers are low." Relying 
on Kraft's added copy modifications and disclosures (Kraft, 
Inc. 1991, CD at 10), the ALJ cited the need for a conflict-
ing statement in an ad to be effective. Thus, the ALJ viewed 
the comparative statement ("lower in sodium") as not dero-
gating the net impression (the FTC standard) that the Lean 
Cuisine entrees are low in sodium. The Commission Deci-
sion (Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 6, 8) adopted the AU's 
view and added that reducing the amount of undesirable el-
ements often results in a perception of diminishing that ele-
ment to a low (i.e., absolute) level. 
The Commission Decision is consistent with research on 
incomplete comparatives in advertising (e.g., "Brand X is 
lower"-without explicitly saying "lower than what"), 
which has shown that consumers often draw overall infer-
ences far beyond the incomplete content of the comparative 
statement (Shimp 1978). Thus, an absolute (e.g., "Brand X 
is low") response might be generated from the incomplete 
comparison that "Brand X is lower." Additionally, the Com-
mission Decision is consistent with consumer research, 
which has shown that the reliance on simplifications (versus 
complete information) is greater for novices (i.e., ordinary 
consumers) than experts (Alba and Hutchinson 1987). 
Perhaps the greatest weight on the relative-absolute issue 
was given to the copy test results by the complaint counsel 
(FTC). This was because the FTC's copy test made it possi-
ble to distinguish between relative and absolute responses to 
open-ended questions and found that only 5 to 14% of re-
spondents provided a "less/lower/reduced" sodium re-
sponse, whereas 43 to 60% provided a "low" sodium re-
sponse (Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at n. 14). 
Interpretation of Multiple Ad Claims 
The second issue concerns the interpretation of multiple 
claims in ads. Often, the interaction of multiple claims in a 
challenged ad presents interpretational problems for re-
searchers and potential grounds for appeals. These problems 
result when other ad executional elements and copy points 
are argued in FTC cases to have attenuated the effects of the 
challenged claim in question ( cf. "ineffective qualification 
implication," Preston 1989, pp. 1281-84). For example, 
Stouffer argued, based on Thompson Medical (1984, CD at 
793), that the great taste component of the challenged ads 
served to contradict or neutralize the low sodium message 
(Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 7). However, the Commission 
disagreed, citing a lack of evidence that a superior taste mes-
sage necessarily contradicts a low sodium claim or that the 
existence of a nondeceptive message precludes the finding 
of an implied deceptive claim. The Commission argued that 
an ad can convey more than one claim and that not all claims 
need to be deceptive for the net impression of the ad to be 
viewed as deceptive (Cliffdale Associates, Inc. 1984, CD at 
178). 
In contrast, problems can arise when multiple claims in an 
ad are related (versus conflicting) and when one of the 
claims directly or indirectly reinforces a challenged claim. 
These multiple, related claims facilitate what is known as re-
lational processing, which involves focusing on similarities 
or shared themes among disparate pieces of information 
(Meyers-Levy 1991; see also Stouffer Foods 1993a, CB at 
16). This contrasts with item-specific processing, which fo-
cuses on aspects that are unique or distinctive to a particular 
claim. For example, in the Stouffer case, related claims in 
the "Make Sense" ad are cited by the Commission as repre-
senting low levels of undesirable nutrients. As noted by the 
Commission (Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 6): 
"Calories. Fat. Sodium." are "skimp[ed] on." The additional lan-
guage in the Make Sense ad "With less than 300 calories, con-
trolled fat and always less than I gram of sodium* per entree ... " 
also reinforces the low sodium message. 
A second consumer processing issue regarding multiple, 
related claims in an ad considered in the Stouffer case is that 
of priming (cf. Herr 1989). Priming involves providing con-
sumers with exemplars or cues that serve to bias their think-
ing in a certain direction. For example, testimony from 
Stouffer Foods (1993a, CB at 16) indicated that the three 
Lean Cuisine ads ("Make Sense," "300 Like a Million," and 
"Lean on Lean Cuisine") all used language in their head-
lines to prime consumers to read and process the ads from a 
"healthy eating" frame of reference. The Commission 
(Stouffer Foods· 1994, CD at 8) termed this as 
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"condition[ing] the reader to think that Lean Cuisine is a 
healthy product," on the basis of ad copy regarding healthy 
ingredients and small quantities of undesirable ingredients. 
The Commission (Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 6) noted that 
"These (positive) representations communicate that the neg-
ative attributes have been reduced to meager quantities." 
Unfortunately, though the presence of multiple, related 
claims provides interesting facial analyses of challenged 
claims, it can also present difficult problems in the con-
struction of control ads for copy tests. 
Control Ad Issues 
Our third and fourth research points from the Stouffer case 
are concerned with issues associated with (1) the use of a 
control ad group for open-ended questions and (2) the use of 
a control ad group to measure pre-existing beliefs. Both 
these points were important appeal arguments made by 
Stouffer Foods in challenging the methodology of the copy 
test conducted for the complaint counsel (Stouffer Foods 
1994, CD at 12). 
The Nature of Controls 
In any study, it is important to have the ability to control the 
situation in which the study is being conducted so as to elim-
inate the role of extraneous forces and competing explana-
tions (Cook and Campbell 1979, pp. 7-9). A control ad is 
often used to separate effects due to the challenged ad claim 
from effects due to external factors associated with such an 
ad claim. Such external factors include previous exposure to 
the ad, other nonchallenged executional and copy point ele-
ments in the ad, and prior beliefs and knowledge associated 
with the advertised product (Cohen 1977; Kraft, Inc. 1989, 
IDF 121, 126; Mitchell1983; Russo, Metcalf, and Stephens 
1981, n. 10; Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 12). The control ad 
group, to which respondents are randomly assigned, re-
ceives a control ad with as few differences from the chal-
lenged test ad as possible-with the exception of the chal-
lenged claim (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 147). Thus, the control 
ad group attempts to account for a priori differences that re-
spondents bring with them to the study setting.7 The differ-
ence between positive responses to the test and control ads 
represents the "minimum number of individuals who would 
take that particular claim away from the ad" (Kraft, Inc. 
1989, IDF 125). As indicated by the testimony in Kraft 
(1989, IDF 124), the basis for the conservative nature of the 
procedure is that: 
.. .it is reasonable to conclude that some of the positive control 
group responses were based on prior exposure to the challenged 
ads and thus are attributable to those ads. Because this is not an 
absolute certainty, all positive control group responses are sub-
tracted from the positive test ad responses. 
In contrast, the control question is a post hoc control for 
external measurement error that may result from the provi-
sion of a closed-ended question format. Such measurement 
7It should be noted that with most control ad group types, respondents 
actually view a control ad (e.g., a purged or tombstone ad, a different ad for 
the same brand, or a corrected ad). However, in one control group type (i.e., 
the nonexposure control), respondents do not see any ad. We explore char-
acteristics and trade-offs of these control ad group choices subsequently. 
concerns include yea-saying bias, inattention, halo effects, 
or other noise factors (Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 104). 
Control Ad Groups and Open-Ended Questions 
In preparation for trial and on appeal, Stouffer argued that 
the complaint counsel's methodology was fatally flawed be-
cause of the absence of a control ad group (Stouffer Foods 
1993c, RB at 44, 1994, CD at 12). Specifically, Stouffer ar-
gued, citing Thompson Medical (1984) and Kraft (1989, 
1991), that "the FTC has made abundantly clear that a con-
trol ad is required to be used for both open-ended and 
closed-ended questions" before survey results can be relied 
on (Stouffer Foods 1993c, RB at 44). Stouffer argued that 
the Commission accepted as reliable a survey in Kraft in 
which a control ad was used for both open-ended and 
closed-ended questions (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 120-23) and 
rejected as unreliable a copy test in which control measures 
were not used to correct for pre-existing or inherent survey 
bias (Kraft, Inc. 1991, CD at n. 19). Stouffer also noted 
(Stouffer Foods 1993c, RB at 46, 66-67, 1994, CD at 12) 
that in Thompson Medical ( 1984, CD at 806-808), the Com-
mission accepted as reliable the ASI theater test for the chal-
lenged Aspercreme ad that included a control ad for a com-
peting product, Mobisyl. The Aspercreme ad was chal-
lenged on the basis that it conveyed the false impression that 
Aspercreme contained aspirin. Responses to the open-ended 
(unaided recall) question indicate that consumers thought 
aspirin was an ingredient in Aspercreme ( 17% ), but not in 
Mobisyl ( 1% ). 
In discussing Stouffer's arguments related to Thompson 
Medical, however, the ALJ noted that the Commission in 
that case did not directly subtract the control responses in 
the analysis of the Aspercreme ad (Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID 
at n. 11; see also 1994, CD at n. 30). In addition, the Com-
mission noted (Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 14) that Stouf-
fer's reliance on Thompson Medical and Kraft as mandating 
a control ad was misplaced. In its decision in Stouffer Foods 
(1994, CD at 14, 15), the Commission indicated that there is 
nothing in Commission precedent requiring the use of a con-
trol ad for open-ended questions, nor dictating the type of 
control necessary in the case of closed-ended questions. 
However, it is noteworthy that this standard, namely, that a 
control ad is not necessary, is likely to be inconsistent with 
certain Lanham Act cases involving exploitive misleading-
ness, in which the court has said that "a control mechanism 
would likely be 'indispensable"' (see Johnson & Johnson * 
Merck Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. 
1992, at 301; American Home Products v. The Procter & 
Gamble Co., Syntex USA, Inc., and Proctor-Syntex Health 
Products Co. 1994, at 10).8 
8Exploitive misleadingness occurs when an advertiser does not mislead 
by creating false beliefs or impressions, but by exploiting those that already 
exist (Russo, Metcalf, and Stephens 1981, p. 125). In Johnson & Johnson 
*Merck Pharmaceuticals Company v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation (at 
301), Johnson & Johnson contend that Smithkline Beecham's ad for Turns 
capitalized on "the unsubstantiated belief that aluminum causes 
Alzheimer's disease." However, Johnson & Johnson's extrinsic evidence to 
support this contention was not given weight by the court partially because 
of the lack of a control ad group to account for these preconceived beliefs. 
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Control Ad Groups and Pre-Existing Beliefs 
Stouffer argued that some number of survey respondents 
were likely to come to the test with a pre-existing belief that 
Lean Cuisine frozen entrees were low in sodium (Stouffer 
Foods 1993c, RB at 44-49, 1994, CD at 12-13). Therefore, 
Stouffer argued that the complaint counsel's copy test 
should have employed a control ad group to "quantify and 
eliminate the effects of participants' pre-existing bias" 
(Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 12-13). However, though the 
Commission acknowledged that the failure to control for 
pre-existing beliefs introduces a potential for bias (Stouffer 
Foods 1994, CD at 13, 16-17), it also indicated that Stouf-
fer failed to establish that pre-existing beliefs affected the 
complaint counsel copy test results (Stouffer Foods 1994, 
CD at n. 29). In fact, as the AU noted, testimony revealed 
consumers believed Lean Cuisine's sodium content was ac-
tually high (Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 87-89). As a result, 
and contrary to the view of Stouffer, there was less of a need 
for a control ad in the copy test methodology in accounting 
for pre-existing beliefs of respondents.9 
With regard to the Commission's decision concerning the 
use of control ads to measure pre-existing beliefs, the impli-
cation for consumer researchers is that it is desirable to first 
understand and account for the extent and direction of any 
strongly held pre-existing bias, because "respondents may 
be held liable for the dissemination of ads that capitalize on 
pre-existing consumer beliefs" (Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 
n. 31, citing Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC 1978, p. 
1137, 1146). Also, conditions may exist in which other ad 
control types and methods are acceptable (cf. Kraft, Inc. 
1989, IDF 126, 147-150); the use of a control ad may be im-
practical (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 149); or its use may lead to 
the "overcontrolling" of the study, because the pre-existing 
beliefs may already be favorable to the party's view or may 
not affect the copy test results in any way. In summary, 
though there are certain situations in which a control ad may 
not be feasible, researchers should be prepared for chal-
lenges if one is not included in the study. 
Control Ad Group Choices and Problems 
There are three generally recognized control ad groups: Re-
spondents can be shown (1) a purged, cleansed, or tomb-
stone ad that is identical to the challenged ad, except that the 
potentially misleading claim is removed, (2) a different ad 
9It should be noted, however, that the direction of pre-existing belief bi-
ases may sometimes match those conveyed by the advertisement in copy 
tests. In American Home Products v. The Procter & Gamble Company, Syn-
tex USA, and Procter-Syntex Health Products (1994), the plaintiff (Ameri-
can Home Products) was seeking a preliminary injunction against the de-
fendant's advertising, alleging that the Procter & Gamble Aleve ads con-
veyed false and misleading claims that American Home Products' Advil 
was less effective and provided less pain relief than Aleve. The plaintiff's 
survey, indicating that 30 to 35% of respondents received a message of 
Aleve's superior duration and efficacy over Advil, was criticized by the 
court for not "properly control[ling] for preconceptions (both accurate and 
inaccurate) that consumers may possess given their continual exposure to 
arc products and advertising" (at 9-10). The court gave substantial weight 
to a survey conducted for the defendant in which, in response to one ques-
tion, "How long do you think Advil lasts?" 50% of the respondents indi-
cated the analgesic effects of Ad vii lasted only two to six hours, with only 
7% responding that Advillasted longer than seven hours. Based, in part, on 
this evidence, the court ruled against granting the preliminary injunction on 
behalf of American Home Products. 
for the same brand, yet one that does not contain the chal-
lenged claim, or (3) no ad at all (i.e., a nonexposure control) 
(Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 147-50; Plevan and Siroky 1991; 
Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 134). 
In practice, difficult trade-offs and decisions must be 
made in the selection of the appropriate control ad type. For 
example, the first approach, using the purged or cleansed ad 
control, may be the best choice when the control ad is virtu-
ally identical to the challenged or test ad, with the exception 
that the challenged claim is excised. 10 In practice, however, 
a situation might arise in which almost everything in the ad 
is part of the challenged claim. This may even include a 
product's brand name (e.g., "Aspercreme" or "Lean Cui-
sine") or prominent executional features. Thus, a purged or 
cleansed ad would be difficult to use because it would re-
quire the deletion of almost all of the ad elements (Stouffer 
Foods 1993b, IDF 139, 147). Such a deletion acquires a 
"tombstone" format, and the inherent risk is that execution-
al differences between the tombstone and test ads are pro-
nounced. This can be mitigated somewhat by using other 
similar clutter or distractor ads in the copy test procedure. 
Another danger in using a tombstone or purged ad control 
occurs when the challenged ad has received extensive and 
recent prior dissemination (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 150). In 
this case, respondents may rely on their recent memory of 
the prior ad or may respond to recognizable cues present in 
the tombstone or purged ad. 
The second approach to control ads uses a different ad for 
the same brand (e.g., "Taste of Cheese" in Kraft, Inc. 1989, 
IDF 120, 147-50). Because strong halo effects may be asso-
ciated with brands for long-running ad campaigns (see 
Mazis, McNeil, and Bernhardt 1983), a different ad (without 
the challenged claim) for the same brand is sometimes rec-
ommended (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 126, 149-50). Yet, this 
choice is open to criticism if strong brand halo effects are 
present (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 148). For example, the chal-
lenged Kraft Singles campaign was cited as reaching 95% of 
the U.S. population an average of nine times in 1985 (Kraft, 
Inc. 1989, IDF 149). However, as indicated by the AU, 
using a different ad control in this situation generated re-
sponses ranging from only 0 to 30% compared to test ad re-
sponses ranging from 47 to 74% (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 131). 
Finally, Maronick (1991) notes that the researcher's chal-
lenge is to find an ad that holds executional and other fea-
tures of the test and control ad constant. Ideal candidates 
also come from different campaigns than that of the chal-
lenged ad. 
The third approach, the use of the nonexposure control 
group, asks respondents, who are not shown any ad, ques-
tions such as: "Based on everything that you have seen or 
heard, does Product X contain Y?" The problem with this 
approach, however, is that the comparison of nonexposure 
and test control group responses is impractical in cases in 
which "a limited number of consumers in the universe [are] 
not ... previously exposed to the challenged ads" (Kraft, Inc. 
10See also Cohen's (1977) testimony describing the advantages and dis-
advantages of a tombstone (i.e., "bare bones") advertisement as a control or 
baseline measure. 
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1989, IDF 149).11 Thus, in such a situation, the nonexposure 
and test group responses are likely to be, a priori, close in 
nature. Also, the nonexposure control group may introduce 
potential measurement bias, because the context of the ques-
tions associated with this control are not directly related to a 
specific ad. 
In the Stouffer Foods case, the complaint counsel (FfC) 
did not use a control ad group. Stouffer, on the other hand, 
used a cleansed ad as a control. However, the ALJ (Stouffer 
Foods 1993b, IDF 138-40) questioned its effectiveness, be-
cause even as cleansed, "the ads contain elements likely to 
convey a low sodium message and ... were related to sensi-
ble, health eating." Thus, the ALJ viewed this cleansed ad as 
"a control that assured the outcome" (Stouffer Foods 1993b, 
ID at 35). 
Control Question Issues 
The fifth issue raised in the Stouffer Foods case relates to the 
inclusion of a control question about a plausible attribute re-
lated to the product, yet not related to information in the 
challenged ad or claim. This practice is important for mea-
suring the extent of yea-saying, inattention, and other noise 
factors from closed-ended questions (Stouffer Foods 1993b, 
IDF 104; Gillette Co. v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc. 1991). The 
percentage of "yes" responses to the control question is then 
subtracted from the percentage of affirmative responses to 
the challenged claim in a closed-ended question (Stouffer 
Foods 1993b, IDF 106). It should be noted, however, that the 
Commission does not always subtract control question re-
sponses from responses to challenged claims (Thompson 
Medical1984, CD at 806-808). 
The notion of a control question is analogous to tests for 
discriminant validity between measures of the target trait or 
attribute and measures of different traits or attributes 
(Campbell and Fiske 1959). To be given weight by the Com-
mission, the control attribute selected should be associated 
with the product, yet not inferred from the challenged ad 
(Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 105, 107). For example, in 
Stouffer Foods (1994, CD at 12), the Commission found a 
control question that substituted sugar for sodium to be ac-
ceptable. On the other hand, the use of an attribute closely 
related or frequently confused with one found in the chal-
lenged ad (e.g., fat and cholesterol) is not viewed favorably 
by the Commission (Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF Ill, 1994, 
CD at n. 24). In this instance, the ALJ (Stouffer Foods 
1993b, IDF 149-52) cited trial testimony showing a high as-
sociation (86%) between consuming less fat and controlling 
higher cholesterol. 
11 Another possibility is to make use of a corrected ad control in which 
the misleading statement is often corrected in the form of revised ad copy 
or disclaimers (Russo, Metcalf, and Stephens 1981, p. 123-26). This pro-
cedure is argued to work best in cases in which advertisers exploit pre-ex-
isting beliefs; however, there is no assurance that such correction will beef-
fective (Russo, Metcalf, and Stephens 1981, pp. 125-26). Such a procedure 
may also necessitate a two-step process in FrC cases: first, discovering the 
misleading conveyance based on pre-existing beliefs; second, correcting for 
it, rather than combining both steps into one. 
Processing of Disclosure Information 
The sixth issue involves the role of disclosure statements in 
advertising and their role in Stouffer Foods (1994). Normal-
ly, the Commission favors the qualification of ambiguous 
and misleading claims through the affirmative disclosure of 
added information (cf. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement 
on Food Advertising 1994; FTC Guides for the Use of Envi-
ronmental Marketing Claims 1992; Wilkie 1985). The 
Stouffer Foods complaint charged as unfair and deceptive, 
and as a separate violation, the failure to disclose adequate-
ly the fact that one gram equals 1000 milligrams (Stouffer 
Foods 1993b, ID at 37). Testimony revealed that the sodium 
content of food is commonly measured in milligrams (Stouf-
fer Foods 1993b, IDF 196). In the Stouffer print ads, the 
Lean Cuisine entrees are described as containing "less than 
one gram of sodium," with footnotes in small print explain-
ing that one gram is equivalent to 1000 milligrams of sodi-
um (Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at 37). 
Although the Commission favors affirmative disclosures, 
it generally finds that small print disclosures do not cure 
misrepresentations created by advertising text (Giant Food, 
Inc. 1962). In Kraft (1991, CD at 124), later-added copy 
modifications and fine print disclosures were ineffective in 
dispelling misleading net impressions (see also Preston 
1989, pp. 1281-84). Also, while examining more complex 
footnote information, Foxman, Muehling, and Moore 
( 1988) found that footnote designations tend to enhance the 
comprehension surrounding the text material, rather than the 
information contained in the footnote. 
In the Stouffer Foods case, though the ALJ concluded that 
the adequate disclosure of sodium content is presumptively 
material, the facts of the case (Stouffer Foods 1993b, IDF 
160-62) reveal that most consumers were unaware of the 
recommended daily allowance of sodium, and knowing the 
precise milligrams of sodium in an entree would be of little 
use (Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at 38). This lack of use was 
noted by the ALJ, even though trial evidence supported the 
common misconception by consumers that one gram of 
sodium is less than 1000 milligrams of sodium (Stouffer 
Foods 1993b, IDF 163). In her Concurring Statement with 
the Commission Decision (Stouffer Foods 1994, at n. 1), 
Commissioner Azcuenaga disagreed on this point. She ar-
gued that the disclosure of sodium levels above 600 mil-
ligrams would be considered by some consumers to be im-
portant to their purchase decisions. 
In summary, the findings reveal the difficulty of disclo-
sures to rectify misleading impressions in cases before the 
Commission. Furthermore, the provision of such disclosure 
information may be viewed as immaterial by the Commis-
sion, as was the case in Stouffer Foods (1993a, b, c, 1994), 
if, in the Commission's judgment, consumers lack the abili-
ty to verify the claims ( cf. credence claims in Darby and 
Kami 1973). However, as was indicated by the ALJ, other 
more knowledgeable segments, such as those on medically 
supervised diets, may need such information (Stouffer Foods 
1993b, ID at 38). Hence, it is an area for potential method-
ological conflict over target markets and appropriate 
samples. 
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Implications for Researchers 
Several implications for consumer researchers can be sum-
marized on the basis of our review of important ad interpre-
tation and copy test issues that arise from the Stouffer Foods 
case, as well as from other FfC case precedent. First, the 
overriding guide in the Commission's consideration of ex-
trinsic evidence is the researcher's adherence to generally 
accepted procedures and principles outlined in previous 
cases before the Commission (e.g., Kraft, Inc. 1991; Stouf 
fer Foods 1994; Thompson Medical 1984) and discussed 
elsewhere (e.g., Jacoby and Szybillo 1995; Maronick 1991; 
Preston 1987, 1992; Stewart 1995). One such principle used 
by the Commission in the evaluation of advertising claims is 
to consider the overall, net impression made by the ad 
(Thompson Medical 1984, CD at 790). This Commission 
standard has been used to evaluate potentially conflicting or 
supporting relative and absolute information in ads, as well 
as related multiple claims, some of which are challenged 
(Stouffer Foods 1994, CD at 7-8). This net impression stan-
dard also governs the effectiveness of disclosure informa-
tion, because small print disclosures are generally not found 
to cure misrepresentations in ads (Stouffer Foods 1994, CD 
at n. 10). Furthermore, the scope of the study's target mar-
ket may dictate the importance of disclosed (and other ad) 
information if it is noticed (Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at 38; 
see also "Concurring Statement" 1994, at n. 1). Also, for 
challenged ads containing both relative and absolute implied 
claims, researchers might consider the use of clearly sepa-
rated categories for the coding of relative versus absolute 
open-ended responses. Finally, as was found in Stouffer 
Foods (1993a, CB at 16, 1994, CD at 6), recent consumer 
behavior research may often be germane to the evaluation of 
multiple claims in challenged ads. This may necessitate an 
understanding and application of recent consumer behavior 
principles, such as relational processing (Meyers-Levy 
1991; Stouffer Foods 1993a, CB at 16) or priming effects 
due to other cues found in the ads (Herr 1989; Stouffer 
Foods 1993a, CB at 16). 
Other implications can be drawn from the control ad de-
bate in the Stouffer case. One such implication is the impor-
tance of understanding the nature and direction of any pre-
existing bias that might occur in the study (Stouffer Foods 
1994, CD at 17). Such an understanding can help guide the 
selection of an appropriate ad control type. For example, if 
there is a concern about a widely disseminated campaign for 
the challenged ad (i.e., an ad halo effect), a different ad con-
trol from a previous campaign for the brand might be con-
sidered (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 126). If the issue is a pre-ex-
isting belief on which the advertiser capitalizes because of 
related information in the ad, a purged or tombstone control 
might be used, as long as the target ad did not receive ex-
tensive prior dissemination (Kraft, Inc. 1989, IDF 150). 
However, a control ad group may not always be feasible. 
Consider, for example, a "worst case scenario" for the re-
searcher in which (1) a different ad control can not be locat-
ed, (2) the challenged ad has been disseminated widely and 
extensively, and (3) everything in the challenged ad (includ-
ing the brand name) conveys the potentially misleading 
claim. Such strong halos may also negate the effectiveness 
of the corrected ad control option. Furthermore, certain con-
trol ad groups for broadcast ads may be difficult to use in a 
study because of the substantial cost of modifying such an 
ad to delete the challenged claim in question (Maronick 
1991). 
Finally, researchers might be careful not to confound con-
trol ad elements or control question attributes with chal-
lenged (and other related) information in the ad (Stouffer 
Foods 1993b, ID at 34-35). Therefore, researchers design-
ing studies with control questions often face a difficult 
choice in the selection of a control attribute on the continu-
um between attributes directly or indirectly associated by 
the consumer with the challenged claim to attributes im-
plausibly associated with the challenged product. In sum-
mary, even when faced with these considerations and trade-
offs, the appropriate use of controls by the researcher can 
help to enhance the validity of extrinsic evidence presented 
before the Commission. 
Concluding Remarks 
Increasingly, methodological differences represent the ma-
jority of discussion in Commission hearings and decisions. 
In Stouffer Foods (1994, CD at 12), the Commission gave 
substantial weight to the complaint counsel's copy test, 
which it viewed as methodologically sound and valid. On 
the other hand, the lack of adherence to generally accepted 
principles has led the Commission either to (1) allocate less 
weight to such extrinsic evidence from the complaint coun-
sel or respondent or (2) reject such evidence all together 
(e.g., see Stouffer Foods 1993b, ID at 35, 1994, CD at 9). 
Therefore, the purpose of our review was to discuss six 
important copy test and ad interpretation issues found in the 
recent Stouffer Foods case at the FfC. These issues includ-
ed: (1) relative and absolute claims, (2) interpretation of 
multiple ad claims, (3) control ad issues regarding applica-
tion to open-ended questions, (4) control ad issues concern-
ing pre-existing beliefs, (5) control question issues, and (6) 
the processing of disclosure information. An overview of 
generally accepted principles for copy test evidence at the 
FfC is provided, along with a discussion of difficult trade-
offs to consider in copy test development. 
On the basis of our review, we offer three points of en-
couragement and caution. First, there is no such thing as a 
perfect copy test. As was noted in Stouffer Foods (1994, CD 
at 13; see also Bristol-Myers Co. 1975, CD at 744; Sudman 
1995), "Perfection is not the prevailing standard for deter-
mining whether a copy test may be given any weight. The 
appropriate standard is whether the evidence is [reasonably] 
reliable and probative." Second, adherence to generally ac-
cepted principles for copy tests tends to increase the relative 
weight given to the evidence by the FfC. Third and finally, 
in the operationalization of such principles, researchers 
might consider carefully the trade-offs involved. This is par-
ticularly important in such decisions as the most appropriate 
(if any) control ad group and/or control question to employ. 
Such alternative consideration is likely to strengthen the 
preparation and provision of extrinsic evidence and copy 
test findings at the Commission. 
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